Critique and Rescue: Adorno’s Dialectical Diagnosis of Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Ford, Russell

















	Adorno is a poor historian if we take the historian’s objective to be that of providing an objective and impartial reflection of a past time.  The philosophical tradition is, for him, a vast and intricate network of symptoms, each significant not in its own right but rather in the way that it indicates a more essential and generative social cause.  This is not a deficiency and, indeed, the politicization of history which began with Marx, if not earlier, marks what is so deeply valuable about Adorno’s thought.  On the one hand, Adorno’s philosophical style adroitly avoids devolving into any sort of naïve historicism that would vainly attempt to reconstruct a thinker’s work according to their ‘original intention.’  On the other hand, by reading the philosophical tradition symptomatically, if not sympathetically, Adorno is able to accomplish two things: first he is able to indicate the structural elements that periodically form and whose repetition gives to the tradition its consistency; second, insofar as these elements are determined according to the index of a particular present, Adorno’s historical diagnosis entails an immanent critique of the present by the very history it discloses.
	In short, Adorno’s method is dialectical – which for him means that it is comprised of two moments, critique and rescue, whose distinguishing characteristic is their temporal character.  This dialectical method is often read against, or mistaken for, that of Hegel, with the presumption that Adorno’s project is simply a sort of negative twist on Hegel’s positive or absolute dialectic.  Judging simply by the frequency with which Adorno enters into debate with Hegel, as well as the tradition of German Idealism that arises in Kant throughout his published work, this comparison seems apt.  However, with the ongoing publication of Adorno’s lecture courses it has become more and more clear that his dialectical method is reliant on, and responds to, a far more diverse cast of characters than that provided by German Idealism.  Nowhere is this more clear than in his course from the summer semester of 1965, entitled Metaphysics: Concept and Problems.  Written as he was completing his major work, Negative Dialectics, the Metaphysics course shows how Adorno’s conception of dialectics is deeply influenced not only be Hegel’s relation to Kant, but, perhaps more deeply, by Aristotle’s relation to Plato.
	It is this latter relationship that provides the starting point for an understanding of the founding moment of the tradition of thinking that Adorno recognizes as metaphysics.  In Aristotle, Adorno finds the first elaboration of the dialectical structure that was merely posited by Plato in the duality between the world of appearance and the Forms.  The contrast between these two thinkers, or rather between these two moments that together constitute the emergence of metaphysical thinking, is indicative of the specific concerns that will come to mark metaphysics as a distinct sort of philosophical inquiry.  For Adorno, these concerns are less material than formal.  In other words, although metaphysics is often marked off as a science of thinking about the ultimate, final, or foundational causes of what is, for Adorno this concern is itself marked and motivated by the Platonic doctrine of Ideas as existing in a realm that is really distinct from the empirical one.  It is this insistence upon another distinct world, a world that is distinguished from the empirical world precisely by its constitution as the truth of this latter world, that inaugurates the trajectory of metaphysics.  However, this moment is incomplete without a second moment, one in which the distance between the two worlds postulated by the first moment is sutured in an attempt to return truth to the world, but without thereby losing the distinctiveness of truth.  Aristotle’s metaphysical philosophy marks, for Adorno, the historical moment of critique and rescue, the inaugural moment of metaphysical thinking, insofar as he reads Aristotle as, on the one hand critically rejecting Plato’s account of the distinct world of really existing Forms and, on the other hand, attempting to preserve Plato’s insight into the constant character of truth.
Adorno’s reading of Aristotle, then, shows that metaphysics does not attain to dialectics only with the Enlightenment – metaphysics is inherently dialectical insofar as its origin lies in Aristotle’s attempt to critique the duality of Plato’s Ideal and empirical worlds while at the same time drawing forth the essential and Ideal truth from out of the empirical.  Adorno writes in the fourth lecture of the course:

	“I believe this way of stating the matter may better define the locus of metaphysics in the history of philosophy, and thus define the essence of metaphysics as well (for I believe the essential is always historical), than would be possible in the relatively superficial lectures one might give on the themes of metaphysics.  Following from this definition one might say that metaphysics, because it attempts to regard Ideas as something linked to the empirical world but endangered by advancing secularization, was itself threatened from the first in its own development.”​[2]​

	Although the exhibition of metaphysics as a fundamentally historical (rather than, for instance, ontological) form of thinking is worthy of consideration in its own right, in this case it is also interesting for the work that this discovery performs in relation to Adorno’s own philosophical project (a project that, in turn, enabled this discovery).  At the end of his lecture course, Adorno turns from his explicit engagement with Aristotle’s Metaphysics to a concern that is more familiar to his readers: how one can think after Auschwitz.  Here Adorno relies upon the transformation that metaphysics undergoes in the project of the Enlightenment from a concern over the relation of the empirical and the transcendent to a concern over that of nature and culture.  However, to simply repeat Aristotle’s metaphysical gesture of critique and rescue upon a Kantian field runs the risk of merely reproducing the catastrophe of recent history.  This recent history is the outcome of an ideology that has sought to mythically fuse nature and culture by drawing the latter from out of the former.  Adorno finds the resolution of the impasse of metaphysics aptly expressed in the “unredeemed program” of the Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit which recognizes the need for what Adorno calls a “metacritique of epistemology.”​[3]​
	While Adorno is principally concerned with epistemology insofar as it provides a ground for contesting such philosophical projects as phenomenology, Heideggerian ontology, existentialism, and analytic positivism, it may also be problematized historically.  Specifically, Adorno’s linking of the metaphysical tradition with the problem of thinking after Auschwitz, a problem that centers on the peculiar status of epistemology, invites the question of the relation of metaphysics and epistemology in Aristotle’s thought which forms the beginning of the tradition’s historical trajectory.  Concerning himself exclusively with the Metaphysics, which readily lends itself to being critiqued in a dialectical fashion, Adorno does not explore (except for a very brief rejection of Heidegger’s ontological recuperation of Aristotle) Aristotle’s account of individual thinking that is found in his On The Soul.  To be sure, the Metaphysics exerted a much greater formative role upon the philosophical tradition through the Neoplatonists and Scholasticism, but On The Soul, precisely because it is by no means easily assimilated to dialectical schematization, may betray the movement of metaphysics to be more complex than Adorno describes.
	Significantly, the strange and difficult account of the imagination offered in the Third Book of On The Soul has no ready correlate in the Metaphysics.  This is striking insofar as the perceptive and thoughtful activity of ensouled beings recapitulates the nature of the world.  It is therefore fitting to ask how and to what extent this element of Aristotle’s epistemology might complicate Adorno’s dialectical depiction of his metaphysics, as well as the formal account of metaphysics that is developed on the basis of this interpretation.  It may be that Aristotle’s account of imagination lays the groundwork for an epistemological metaphysics, a thinking about thinking, that is no longer confined to the debilitating structure of what will become dialectical metaphysics.

The Fate of Force
	Adorno declares at the outset of his exposition that it will be heavily reliant upon the work of the 19th century Hegelian Eduard Zeller, since, in the lecture course, he is “more concerned to throw light on the problems and history of metaphysics through Aristotle than to give [you] an irreproachably punctilious account of that philosopher’s work.”​[4]​  The path that Adorno follows in his exposition is one that takes as its starting point Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic Ideas.  Broadly speaking, Aristotle rejects the hypostatizing of concepts, derived from empirical sources, in a separate, transcendental domain.  Specifically, this criticism is comprised of three components that ground and orient Adorno’s account of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  First, Aristotle rejects the substantiality of universal concepts; second, he rejects the absolute separation and autonomy of the Platonic Ideas, or of substance generally; and, finally, he rejects as inconsistent the contention that the autonomous and separate Ideas could ever function as causes in relation to empirical appearances.  Together, these objections constitute and express the original problem of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: that of the universal and the particular.
	Aristotle’s rejection of the Platonic solution to the problem of the universal and the particular does not take the form of a mere reversal.  Following what Adorno claims is the formal mark of metaphysical thinking – a combination of a critical moment with a moment of rescue or salvage – Aristotle’s Metaphysics is guided by a concern to simultaneously reject the Platonic claim concerning the unreality of the empirical and the substantiality of the universal, and to salvage the Platonic notion of truthful substantiality by linking it with the empirical.  Where Plato opposed the universal and the particular, going so far as to eliminate any truth value that the latter might lay claim to, Aristotle, who shares Plato’s concern for the discovery of truth, and therefore also a concern for the distinction between the universal and the particular, rejects the sufficiency of this distinction for arriving at a solution.
	What is at issue in the determination of the respective truth content of the universal and the particular for Aristotle, and what is forced to choose a side between them (that of the universal) by Plato, is the concept of substantiality (ousia).  However, the universal cannot be substantial if by substance is meant something that is reliant upon nothing else for its existence.  Insofar as the Platonic Ideas are hypostatized empirical qualities (and Adorno emphasizes that this is apparently one of the central lessons of the Parmenides, perhaps due to an influence of Aristotle upon Plato)​[5]​, they show themselves to be insubstantial.  What is substantial can then only be particular things, understood not as determinate and individuated objects of perception, but as immediate things (tode ti).  Here by “immediate” Adorno is emphasizing that immediate things are not mediated, especially not by any sort of sensory apparatus, and therefore they are uncritically and objectively real (this is Aristotle’s “naïve realism”).  Substance, for Aristotle, is to be seen “in terms of the immediate objectivity of the external world, and not in terms of mediation through the perceiving consciousness.”​[6]​  This is not to say, however, that there is no mediation at all, for to do so would bring an abrupt end to the inquiry.  Although substances are immediate, these substances give rise to what Aristotle, in the Categories, calls “secondary substances.” (deuterai ousiai)​[7]​  With these, the account of substance and immediacy is, in Adorno’s words, “turned on its head.”​[8]​
	Having successfully critiqued the alleged substantiality of the Platonic Ideas by showing that these Ideas are in fact reliant upon the empirical for their existence, and thereby showing the immediately existing to be what is properly called substance, Aristotle then sets about rescuing the Platonic conception of an unchanging truth by differentiating the immediate thing (tode ti) from its concept.  The immediate thing, substance properly called, is now to be distinguished from its conceptualizations, the “secondary substances,” which are substances only to the extent that they are more or less proximate to the immediate thing.  Thus Socrates is a proper substance, an immediate thing, but is only thinkable through secondary substances, concepts, such as “human,” “male,” and “living being,” each of which warrants the appellation “substance” precisely to the degree that it specifies the individual thing and not another.  The thing, substance proper, therefore always corresponds to a multiplicity of concepts while, at the same time, concepts never fully individuate a thing but remain applicable to multiple individual things.  Substance thereby gives rise to a dynamic reciprocality of thing and concept that determines Aristotle’s resolution of the problem of the “One in the Many.”
	Where Plato had sought the resolution of this problem in the rigid determination of the (untruthful apparent) thing from its (truthful ideal) conceptualization, Aristotle argues that this separation proved untenable from the standpoint of causality.  Adorno’s reading emphasizes that this causality is, in its problematic exposition, doubly dynamic: comprising both the immediate determination of concepts, and the conceptual determination of the immediate thing.  This double dynamic is expressed in the terminological dyad “form and matter” (morphe and hule) which supersedes the Platonic distinction between “eidos” and “ta onta.”  What differentiates the two sets of terms is that Plato’s are irreducibly different, whereas Aristotle’s are necessarily interrelated (or, in Adorno’s reading, mediated) insofar as they are determined by the need to resolve to problem of causality posed by the Platonic schema.  However, if the generation of this dynamic duality is due to a critique of the gap (chorismos) in the Platonic account of the “One in the Many” then Aristotle’s resolution of the problematic remains fundamentally Platonic.  Here emerges Aristotle’s own understanding of the central difficulty of Platonism: the problem is not accounting for the superiority of the Ideas, but rather of explaining the mechanism or the activity by which this superiority is exercised and preserved.
	On the one hand, the Platonic chorismos is overcome by the interrelation of the dyad of form and matter.  The conceptualization of the immediate yields these two characteristics as the two possible emphases for the individuality that this conceptualization would express.  The brute there-ness of the thing is most properly its matter, but, as Aristotle emphasizes, to remove all formal characteristics from the individual and immediate thing is to eliminate that thing itself.  Therefore, on the other hand, another aspect of the Platonic chorismos is preserved in Aristotle’s account insofar as determination only arises through the assumption of form by matter.  Adorno summarizes this result as follows:

	“On the one hand, the Platonic doctrine that Ideas or Forms have being in themselves is maintained, in the sense that reality – or at any rate, higher reality – is attributed only to them; but, on the other hand, this reality is not susceptible to thought, or only within that in which it is realized.  This makes the question of the realization of form the central problem.  For while form is regarded as the higher reality and that which has true being-in-itself, nevertheless, it has this being only within matter.  Thus, the truly fundamental problem of Aristotle’s philosophy becomes the realization of form.  And this question is, at the same time, none other than the question about change, which relates both to the effect of form on matter and to matter itself, and finally, to the relation between the two.”​[9]​

	The consequent transformation of the dyad of matter and form into that of potentiality and actuality is the reflection of the transformation of the Platonic problematic of cause into the Aristotelian problem of change.​[10]​  Adorno insists upon this point repeatedly throughout his lectures as a decisive difference between the two thinkers.  The consequences of this transformation are decisive for metaphysics in general, but also for Aristotle’s particular conclusions.  Matter and form remain, for Aristotle, determinate and independent concepts (and Adorno is quick to emphasize the ease with which Aristotle converts immediacy into something conceptual​[11]​), but their relation is not multiple and determinate, but eternal.  That is, even though matter exists in order to become form (and this is the meaning of dunamis) this change is never complete insofar as matter and form retain their essential distinction.  This essential distinction of matter and form, whose conceptual structure refigures the Platonic problem of causality as the problem of change, thus divides the famous “four causes” into two principles: the changing and the ordering form of the change (dunamis and energeia).  Thus Aristotle has managed to salvage the Platonic unchanging – esteemed as more true and more valuable than the changing – precisely through a critique of the account of causality that engendered it.  The eternal, as Adorno puts it, has become the pure actuality of change.​[12]​

	“Now, the reason given by Aristotle for this eternal quality of the relationship between the two basic categories [matter and form], and thus for the eternal nature of movement itself … is none other than that both the genesis and the disappearance of this movement, and thus of the relationship between the two, can in turn only be caused by a movement.”​[13]​

	This movement of change is not, despite Aristotle’s best efforts, determined solely by the unchanging formal element.  Matter has its own dynamic principle by which it is predisposed to formal determination.  On the one hand this predisposition is the fate that befalls matter insofar as, under this term, Aristotle is able to incorporate the immediate into the conceptual.​[14]​  This fate befalls being as its eternal past but at the same time organizes and determines that past according to the being that it becomes.  The unity of this movement of change is expressed in the “unmoved mover” which, following Adorno’s reading, is more properly the actuality of being than its causal agent.

	“From the oneness of the world and the oneness of movement as he conceives it, [Aristotle] deduces cosmologically the absolute oneness of the prime mover.”​[15]​

	Fittingly, it is with the activity of the prime mover, which, he claims, takes us from Aristotle’s metaphysics to his theology that Adorno concludes his discussion of Aristotle’s text.​[16]​  Fitting, because it is this unifying conception that provides the conception adequate to the problem of change that resulted from the critique of Platonic metaphysics, and thus preserves the priority of the conceptual over the immediate.  This priority is further emphasized by the character of the actuality of the unmoved mover: it is thinking about thinking (noesis noeseos).  The activity of the unmoved mover is a purely formal one, a purely conceptual thinking devoid of practical matter, for only in this way can its end remain immanent to its activity.
	Adorno is particularly intrigued by this “apotheosis of pure thought” which seems to join together Aristotle’s metaphysics, theology, and epistemology.  He writes that this apotheosis “is the point at which the project for an objective ontology clashes with the concept and violently absorbs it, and this in turn implies the recourse to subjectivity on which all idealist metaphysics is founded.”​[17]​  This “recourse to subjectivity” that is emphasized by Adorno’s reading of the conceptual structure of Aristotle’s metaphysics is at the same time troubled by the immediacy that is forsaken and forgotten in the drive to conceptualization.  Having transformed the problem of cause into the problem of change, Aristotle is left to account both for the resolution of change (conceptuality; actuality) and the impulse to change (immediacy; necessity).  The latter presents “a curious tension and difficulty” since the almost paradoxical conception of the immediate as matter (hule) is, on the one hand, “denigrated, disqualified, censured in every respect, including the moral, while on the other there is the remarkable assumption whereby this element, though heterogeneous with regard to form, is endowed with a kind of animation, a tendency, even a kind of yearning.”​[18]​  This yearning is ananke, the necessity that immediacy, substance, be given over to actualization, but also the necessity of this fate for actualization itself.  Dunamis is therefore the name of the force that simultaneously engenders and eludes the conceptualization that gives it force.

Imaginary Difficulties
	Adorno’s insistence upon a structural reading of Aristotle’s metaphysical system has the advantage of foregrounding and emphasizing the transformation of the Platonic philosophy that he inherits, and of using this relation to draw attention to a structural peculiarity of the metaphysical tradition itself: the double movement of critique and rescue.  However, this interpretation fails to incorporate any other relevant portions of the Aristotelian corpus.  This is no doubt due to the particular emphasis upon the situation of contemporary metaphysics that orients the overall aim of the lecture course, but such an inclusion is, to a certain extent, demanded insofar as Adorno concludes his account by explicitly linking Aristotle’s metaphysics to his epistemology.  This epistemology, as it is developed in On The Soul, clearly exhibits a number of parallels to Adorno’s structural account of the Metaphysics: the work is organized by a concern with a particular type of change (namely, that which is proper to the soul), the investigation proceeds according to the familiar conceptual duality of matter and form, and the dynamic tension of this duality is ultimately resolved in contemplation, thinking about thinking.  However, what is most striking about On The Soul is the account of the imagination as a distinct type of change (neither perceptive nor intellectual) that properly belongs to certain kinds of ensouled beings.  This account of the imagination may not only serve as something of an Aristotelian rejoinder to Adorno’s claims concerning Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but may also indicate a direction for further study of the metaphysical tradition (both before and after Aristotle) that would emphasize the difficulty in situating the imagination within purely metaphysical accounts of the human.​[19]​
	The inquiry into the soul is a specific inquiry within the larger framework of the account of change given in the Metaphysics, the Physics, and elsewhere.  Its aim is to develop a specific account of that sort of change that distinguishes the soul from other sorts of beings.  The soul, in turn, is conceived as the supreme manifestation of change itself insofar as it alone is capable of attaining to the pure and self-contained activity of thinking about thinking.  Aristotle develops an account of this sort of change by beginning with motion, the simplest sort of change for an ensouled being to participate in.  Aristotle’s definition of motion, that it is “the actuality of potency as potency,”​[20]​ is conjoined to the distinguishing characteristic of the soul: that the source of change is that which undergoes the change.  Thus the sorts of change that can be properly attributed to the soul are the nutritive, the perceptive, and the intellective.  The ensouled individual thing would then be, in each case, a certain way of preserving a physical disposition amidst self-determined change.
	In the commentary accompanying his translation of On The Soul, Joe Sachs writes that “in a certain way, the whole of the perceptible world is present in, at-work in, the animal soul, and part of its life rather than mere material that might underlie it.”​[21]​  It is Aristotle’s account of perception that the account of the soul most clearly begins to reflect Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  Perception operates in the same way for each of the senses.  The thing perceived and the perceiving organ are individual bodies related by the common body of an appropriate medium.  Perception then consists in the actualization of the receptive medium by the thing perceived (specifically by its being what it is) and the corresponding reception of this actualization by the sense organ, which is thereby itself actualized.  Aristotle emphasizes at the conclusion of his account that it is the form and not the matter of the thing, medium, and sense organ, that determines sensation.  In some ensouled beings, this is the extent of the work of the sense organs and perception and it is clear, then, how the activity of contemplative thinking agrees with the account provided in the Metaphysics.  Aristotle writes in On The Soul that the mind is “the form of forms” (here using the Platonic term “eidos” rather than “morphe”) meaning that it is the pure potency to be actualized as conceptualized nature according to the aspects of that nature that are reflected in perception.  The unmoved mover is therefore the actualization of nature itself – which includes all ensouled beings – insofar as this actualization requires no transmission.
	While this account emphasizes the parallel between the epistemology of On The Soul and the metaphysics (and theology) of the Metaphysics, it ignores an essential component of Aristotle’s account of the soul: the imagination which is distinct from, but tied to, both perception and thinking.  For Adorno, Aristotle’s Metaphysics works against the very problematic that it exposes when it attempts to resolve the dual tension of change by conceptualizing the immediate thing.  The difficulty encountered there is that the individual thing only becomes “thinkable,” only assumes a form, insofar as it becomes conceptualized.  On The Soul explains this transition in its account of perception and thinking, but adds the imagination as an intermediary power.
	For Aristotle, imaginings “remain within” perception, but the imagination is not reducible to perception.  It differs insofar as the imagination is itself a motion of the soul that is caused by the receptive actualization of the sense organs.  Significantly, this motion is not actualized in thinking, although thinking relies upon this motion for its own proper activity.  Moreover, this actualization is possible even in the absence of a perceived thing that would provoke the sensation.  Imagination is therefore a power of sensation autonomous from the potential actualization of the sense organs, and this is confirmed by Aristotle’s accounts of the accompaniment of sense perception by imagination.  In terms of the metaphysical problematic sketched by Adorno, the imagination would be a power of the immediate thing to trouble its conceptuality precisely by lending this conceptuality the possibility of being fictional, which is antithetical to the actualization of the substantiality of the thing conceptualized.
	Adorno concludes his discussion of ananke, of the fateful force of the immediate thing, by glimpsing something of this imaginative faculty when he writes:

	“Because the regularity of natural causality can never equal the internal coherence of successive moments, as Aristotle seeks to describe it through his teleology, everything causal also seems to have a moment of the fortuitous.  And, perhaps more important, apart from the moment of causality there are all those moments which cannot be subsumed under the principle of identity and which, in accordance with the omnipotent principle of identity in thought, must appear as extraneous and accidental.  There is thus a curious correlation between causality and chance; and the more relentless the dominance of causality, of causal-mechanical thinking, becomes in the world, the more the category of chance increases, as a kind of reminder of how much meaning, how much internal coherence, has been lost through the predominance of causality.  No doubt there are social reasons for this – the fact that, as rationality has increased in the means of social organization, the ends of social organization have remained irrational, fortuitous.”​[22]​
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